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Abstract 
We investigate the effect of the expulsion of a player on the outcome of 
a football match. For that purpose we develop a probability model for the 
score in a football match. We propose estimators of the expulsion effect that 
are independent of match-specific effects that reflect the relative strength 
of the teams. We use the estimates to predict the expulsion effect on the 
outcome of a match between teams of equal strength. 
Acknowledgement: We thank Gusta Renes for helpful comments. We are grateful to 
Tony Lancaster for spotting an embarrassing error in a previous version. 
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1. ïntroduction 
Football is the most popular sport in the world. It is one of the few 
truly universal games with active participants in all countries. In addition, 
professional football is a prominent industry. Hence, it is not surprising 
that there is a permanent debate over the rules of the game. This discussion 
usually focuses on changes in the rules that would increase the number of 
goals scored, and, in general, would make football more attractive to 
spectators. One change that has been implemented is to make it easier to expel 
a player from a match . Under the old rules a player was sent off if he hit 
another player intentionally in an action that did not involve the ball. Under 
the new rules a player can be sent off for repeated fouls and for using 
illegal means to stop an action that with a high probability would result in a 
goal. The idea behind these changes is to make it harder to rely on rough 
defensive play. 
If the referee decides to expel a player, he shows him a red card. So in 
the language of football the showing of the red card and the expulsion of the 
player are synonymous. 
In this paper we investigate the effect of a red card, i.e. the effect of 
the expulsion of a player, on the outcome of a match. Popular opinion holds 
widely different views on the effectiveness of the red card as an instrument 
to affect the outcome, but as f ar as we know there has been no empirical 
research on this question. We propose a model for the score in a match, that 
can be used to estimate the effect of the red card on the scoring intensities 
of the teams. This model is a probability model for the outcome that takes 
account of the differences in the strengths of the teams and the non-constant 
scoring intensity during the match. More specifically, we propose a 
time-inhomogeneous Poisson model with a match-specific effect for the score in 
a match. 
We propose two estimators for the effect of the red card on the scoring 
intensity. The Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimator is independent 
of the match-specific effects. The CML estimator for the Poisson regression 
model was introduced in econometrics by Hausman, Hall and Grilliches (1984), 
building on ideas of Andersen (1973). The other estimator, the OLS estimator, 
depends on match-specific effects, and hence is potentially biased. Indeed we 
obtain rather different and uninterpretable results with this estimator. We 
use the CML estimates and the model to investigate the effect of a red card on 
the outcome of a match. 
If a player is sent off, he is excluded for the remainder of the match. 
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we specify a model for 
the score in a match. Estimation methods are discussed in section 3, and in 
section 4 we give the estimates. We consider some implications of the 
estimates in section 5. 
2. A Model for the Score in a Football Match 
First we introducé some notation. The subscript i denotes a match, and 
ij, i=l ,2 the two teams or sides playing in that match. In matches with a red 
card we always take it that the red card is given against the second team. 
Time is measured in minutes on the scale 0 to 90, which is the official 
duration of a football match. In a football match the clock is not stopped 
when a match is interrupted, but the referee can allow for stoppage time at 
the end of the first an second halfs, after 45 and 90 minutes respectively. 
Recorded time is however measured from the beginning of the match and from the 
resumption of play after the interval. As a result there may be some minutes 
when there is no play at all, while the 45-th and 90-th minute may last longer 
than a minute's time, but this is a minor distortion. 
minute in which a player is expelled from team 2. 
total number of goals scored in match i by team j . 
number of goals scored before r,-. 
number of goals scored after Tj. 
rate or intensity of scoring of team j in match i at 
t-th minute of play. 
multiplicative effect on A,-j-(i) of removal of player 
from team 2. 
relative strength of team j in match i as compared with 
the overall average strength or scoring rate, as defined 
in section 3. 
We make the following assumptions 
1. The two teams score according to two independent Poisson processes. As a 
consequence the number of goals scored by team 1 is stochastically independent 
of the number of goals scored by team 2. Moreover the time intervals between 
subsequent goals are stochastically independent. The scoring intensities are 
not constant over the match, so that the Poisson processes are nonhomogeneous. 
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Let 
Mij 
°i 
Jij 
2. The ratio of the scoring intensities of the two full teams is constant, 
i.e. ^ij(t)=fij\(t) for matches of eleven against eleven players, with \{t) 
the average scoring intensity at the t-ih minute of play, averaged over all 
teams in all matches with full sides of eleven players against eleven.. 
3. After the red card, for £>Tj, team 2 has 10 players, and the scoring 
intensities are öj-y.yA(t), .7=1,2. 
In assumption 1 we describe the score in a match as a random phenomenon 
that is only partly predictable. Here we are only interested in three factors 
that affect the score. These factors are the play ing time, the relative 
strength of the teams and the effect of the red card. Evidence cited below 
suggests that the scoring intensity increases with the time played. If we do 
not allow for this, then our estimate of the effect of the red card will be 
biased upward, because we confound the effect of the red card and the effect 
of the time played. Of course, the score is strongly affected by the relative 
strength of the teams. The incidence of red cards may be related to the 
relative strength, so that a comparison of a red card game to an average game 
without a red card gives a biased estimate of the effect of the red card. Not 
only the incidence, but also the timing of red cards may be related to the 
relative strength of the teams, and again this biases our estimate of the 
effect of the red card. The third factor is the effect of the red card, which 
by assumption 3 is measured by 6Ï and ö2, where, without loss of generality, 
we assume that a player of team 2 is expelled. 
We must stress that our intention is not to predict the outcome of 
football matches. For that purpose we require, among other things, an estimate 
of Jij. Our estimate of the effect of the red card is independent of y,-7-, 
which is of great help, because finding a good estimate of y,-j is hard, as 
experience with the prediction of outcomes shows. The Poisson assumption is an 
acknowledgement of the fundamental randomness of the score in a match. 
The consequences of the Poisson assumption are mentioned in assumption 1. 
It is not difficult to relax the Poisson assumption, at the cost of a more 
involved statistical analysis. For instance, one can make the scoring 
intensity dependent on the number of goals scored by both teams. We can also 
allow for variations in the relative strength during the match by subdividing 
the 90 minutes in time intervals. In the sequel we shall maintain the 
assumptions 1-3, because we doubt whether our limited number of observations 
will support a more specific and complete model. 
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3. Statistical analysis 
3.1 Estimation of the average scoring intensity 
In table 1 goals scored in 340 matches in the two professional divisions 
2 in the Netherlands in the season 1991/1992 are classified by the 15-mimite 
interval in which they were scored. This table that excludes red card matches, 
shows that the rate at which goals are scored increases monotonically over the 
match. The extra-time effect can account for some of the increase in the rate 
in the last 15 minutes of the first and second halfs. A monotonous increase in 
the scoring rate has also been observed in England (see Morris (1981) who uses 
data on matches in the English League and FA-cup matches in the period April 
1978 until November 1980). 
We estimate the average scoring intensity from the data in table 1. The 
average scoring intensity is specified as 
(3.1) A(«) = a + 0* 
The expected number of goals scored by a team j in match i (each match gives 
two observations) in the s-th 15 minute interval is 
(3.2) E(NiJ3) = Ty(15<* + 112.5)8(25-1)) * = 1,...,6 
Hence the average number of goals scored by one side in the 5-th time interval 
is 
(3.3) E(N3) = 15a + 112.5/?(2s-l) s = 1,...,6 
where we take y = l . Note that the average is taken over all matches and both 
teams in a match. By setting y we implicitly define a scale for y^, e.g. if 
YJ ,=2 , then team j has a scoring intensity in match i that is two times the 
average scoring intensity. 
OLS regression of the average number of goals scored per minute in time 
interval s -this average can be computed from table 1 by division by twice the 
number of matches (680 observations)- on 7.5(2s-l) gives estimates of a and /?. 
2 
Professional football in the Netherlands is organized in two divisions. The 
first division (Dutch: eredivisie) contains the stronger teams. Each year 
two or three teams are promoted from the second division (Dutch: eerste 
divisie) to the first. 
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We find (R =.95; Standard errors in parentheses ) 
c* = .01167 (.00027) fi = .00008627 (.0000080) 
In the sequel we ignore the sampling variance of these estimates. This 
simplifies the computation of variances, and provides an acceptable 
approximation, because the sampling variances are small. The estimates imply 
that the 90 minute scoring intensity 90A(t) increases from 1.05 in the first 
mimite to 1.75 in the final minute. 
3.2 A Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimator of the Red Card Effect 
It is likely that the incidence of red cards is related to the relative 
strength y,^. Hence, a comparison of red card matches with the average match 
may give a biased estimate of the effect of the red card. For that reason we 
propose an estimator that does not depend on the y^-'s or their distribution. 
This estimator is based on a comparison of the number of goals scored by the 
same team before and after the red card. More precisely, we consider the 
fraction of the goals scored after the red card. It is intuitively clear that 
4 this fraction is independent of the time-constant match specific effect . 
Under assumptions 1-3 (P denotes the Poisson distribution) 
(3.4) Kij ~ P(ri^A(t)dt) 
90 
Mtj ~ P(ej7ijj x(t)dt) 
In the sequel we denote 
(3.5) Ai = ?A(t)d< 90 Bi = ƒ X(t)dt 
The fraction of the goals scored after the red card is 
(3.6) Mg 
" IJ 
The reported Standard errors are consistent in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. 
4 
This deals also with the potential home advantage that is reflected in the 
match-specific effects. 
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The conditional distribution of MtJ given Ntj is 
(3.7) M^Nij ~ B(iVy,fly(e)) 
where B denotes the Binomial distribution, and 
<3-8> M*> - i^i-
The conditional distribution is degenerate if A/y-=0, and y,j is only defined 
if Ntj>l. In the CML procedure we omit observations with Ntj=0. Our estimators 
of the red card effect are not biased by this restriction, as we shall see 
shortly. 
In the conditional distribution (3.7) the match specific effects y,j 
cancel. Hence, the conditional likelihood based on this Binomial distribution 
does not depend on the match specific effects. The conditional loglikelood is, 
up to an additive constant that does not depend on 9j, 
(3.9) logLj = . L ' MijlogigijiOj)) + {N^-M^logil-g^e^) 
with nu n2 the number of observations on teams that do not and do receive a 
red card, respectively. Because we condition on the total scores A/^ -, we can 
treat them as non-stochastic constants in the derivation of the properties of 
the CML estimator. Hence, omitting observations with a given total score does 
not make the CML estimator asymptotically biased, and in particular we can 
omit observations with /Vjj=0. 
The likelihood equation is 
tl,- n.j 
(3.10) .E i Nijgij(6CMLj) = jL i Nijyij 
This equation can be interpreted as a moment equation in which a weighted 
average of the y^-'s is equated to a weighted average of their expectations. 
The weights are the total scores Ntj. Because the A/,j can be treated as known 
constants, our earlier remark that our estimator only depends on the fraction 
of goals scored after the red card applies. 
In deriving the properties of the CML estimator we note that the Binomial 
parameter gij(Oj) can be written in the Logit form. 
JogiB^+logiBi/Ai) 
( 3 , 1 1 ) 9ij(6j) =
 iJogidfrlogiBt/Ai) 
Hence, the loglikelihood is globally concave in log(9j), so that the CML 
estimator for 9j is uniquely defined. The asymptotic variance of the CML 
estimator is 
(3.12) V(9CMLj) = e
2 
feNijgijmi-gijie)] 
3.3. OLS Estimation of the Red Card Effect 
With an additional assumption we can estimate the effect of the red card 
with a linear regression estimator. From (3.4) 
Kij = yjAi + {yirrj)Ai + (Kij-EiKylYij)) = f / < + vUj 
(3.13) 
Mtj = YjOjBi + (Jij-rj)9jBi + [Mij-ElMijlrij)) = yfifr + v2ij 
In (3.13) we allow the average relative strength in red card games to be 
different from that in all games, which we have set equal to 1. The estimates 
of yx and y2 indteate the average strengths of the teams with eleven and ten 
players, before a player of team 2 is expelled. The disturbances vUj and v2ij 
are heteroscedastic and correlated. Hence, to obtain an efficiënt estimator of 
dj we must use an estimation method that deals with these issues. 
Alternatively, we can just use OLS and employ the well-known 
heteroscedasticity-consistent expressions for the (co)variances. Note that we 
require an additional assumption to ensure that OLS gives consistent 
estimates. 
2 2 
4. Cov(y,j,j4j) = Cov(yij-,B,-) = 0. A sufficiënt condition for this is that Tt 
and y^ are stochastically independent. 
If we denote the OLS estimates of y? and @j"fj in (3.13) by <5y and 62j 
respectively, we estimate dj by 
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hj 
* U 
(3.i4) e0LSj = 
The asymptotic variance is 
S (3.15) V{8OLSj) = ^ - V^j) - 2 g x CouiS^Syj + ^ - V(62j) 
6ij °ij 6ij 
In (3.15) 
n n 
2 ,2 ._. 2 „2 i ? i e l « i ^ « « : ? i e 2 t j ^ i ,
 A -?. e l ije2i jAiBj 
(3.16) K(6y) = 1=1 V(S2j) = 1=1 Covfrjjy) = 1=1 
( i £ i ^ ) 2 ( i ? i ^ ) 2 ( i ^ ) ( i £ i fi2) 
with e -^j and e2,-j the OLS residuals of the regression equations in (3.13). 
4. Estimation Results 
In the previous section we proposed two estimators of the effect of the 
red card on the scoring intensity. We apply these estimators to data on 140 
red card games in the seasons 89-90, 90-91 and 91-92 in both divisions of the 
Dutch professional football league. Because for the CML estimator we must omit 
observations where a team has not scored neither before nor after the red 
card, the effective number of observations is 112 for teams with eleven 
players and 93 for teams with ten players. We obtain the following results 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
a. CML estimator QCML 
êcMLi = 1-78 (.27) BCML2 = .68 (.15) 
b. OLS estimator 8OLS 
OOLSI = 1-43 (.03) 6OLS2 = 1.14 (.03) 
According to the CML estimates the scoring intensity increases for the team 
with 11 players (team 1). The effect is statistically significant. The scoring 
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intensity for the team with 10 players (team 2) decreases, and the effect is 
just significant. The OLS estimator gives rather different results. The 
estimated increase in the scoring intensity for the team with 11 players is 
much smaller than for the CML estimator (but highly significant). More 
surprisingly, the OLS estimator shows a statistically significant increase in 
the scoring intensity for the team that loses one player. This is an 
indication that the OLS estimator, that uses between-game information, is 
biased. Therefore, we use the CML estimates in our analysis of the effect of 
the red card on the outcome of a match. 
We conclude that the red card increases the scoring intensity of the team 
with 11 players by 78%. The decrease in the scoring intensity of the team with 
10 players is much smaller, 32%. 
5 The first-stage regressions of the OLS estimator show that the average 
team that receives the red card, has the same scoring intensity as the average 
team in the competition. However, the opposing team is on average much 
stronger than the average team in the competition. This is in keeping with the 
rules whereby the red card primarily punishes rough defensive play but not 
aggressive play. Hence, the red card usually affects the weaker team, but the 
scoring intensity of this team is not significantly reduced. The scoring 
intensity of the opposing team, that was already larger, is further increased 
by the red card. 
5. Some Implications of the Estimates 
We can use our model to estimate the effect of the red card on the 
outcome of a football match. Our model implies that the effect of the red card 
depends on the relative strengths of the teams as measured by y ü and yi2. In 
our calculations we set 7,i=yj2=l5 i-e. we consider a match between two teams 
that have the average scoring intensity of the competition. In this way we 
isolate the effect of the red card from the existing difference in relative 
strength between the teams. Let N^T) and N2(T) denote the total number of 
goals scored by the teams with 11 and 10 players, respectively, with a red 
card given in the r- th minute of the match. In Table 2 we give the 
probabilities of the three possible outcomes of the match as a function of r. 
The last row of the table shows that the probability of a draw between 
two teams of average strength is .25. This is an indication of the role of 
chance in the outcome of a football match. A red card early in the match 
5 
The estimates of the average strengths of the teams with 10 and 11 players 
before the red card are y 2 = 1 0 3 (-09) a n d T l = J - 3 3 f '09)-
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increases the probability of a victory of the team with 11 players 
substantially. The probability of a victory of the team with 10 players 
decreases even more, while the change in the probability of a draw is 
relatively small. 
When a red card is given, a player is expelled for the remainder of the 
match. In indoor football and ice hockey a player can be excluded for a 
certain period. In Table 3 we show the effect of a 15 minute time penalty on 
the outcome of a match between equally strong teams. Although the effect 
depends on the time at which the penalty is imposed, this dependence is rather 
weak. 
As noted in the introduction, a motivation for the more frequent use of 
the red card is to increase the number of goals scored in a match. In Table 4 
we report the expected number of goals scored in a match between equally 
strong teams as a function of the time of the red card. We conclude that the 
red card has the desired effect. 
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Table 1. Goals scored in season 1991/1992 by 15-minute interval 
Time interval Number of goals 
0-15 128 
16-30 140 
31-45 147 
46-60 169 
61-75 170 
76-90 198 
Table 2. Probabilities of the outcome of the match by minute of the red card. 
Minute of Pr(team of 11 wins) Pr(draw) Pr(team of 10 wins) 
red card r 
0 .71 .17 .12 
15 .67 .18 .15 
30 .62 .20 .18 
45 .57 .22 .21 
60 .51 .23 .26 
75 .45 .24 .31 
90 .375 .25 .375 
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Table 3. Probabilities of the outcome of a match with a 15 minute exclusion 
starting at r. 
Pr(draw) Pr(team of 10 wins) 
.25 .33 
.24 .33 
.25 .32 
.24 .32 
.24 .32 
.24 .31 
Start of Pr(team 
penalty r 
0 .42 
15 .43 
30 .43 
45 .44 
60 .44 
75 .45 
Table 4. Expected number of goals in match by minute of red card. 
Minute of red card r Expected number of goals 
0 3.44 
15 3.36 
30 3.26 
45 3.16 
60 3.05 
75 2.93 
90 2.80 
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